Abstract. Various proposals have recently been made which cast cortical processing in terms of hierarchical statistical generative models (Mumford, 1994; Kawato, 1993; Hinton & Zemel, 1994; Zemel, 1994; Hinton et al, 1995; Dayan et al, 1995; Olshausen & Field, 1996; Rao & Ballard, 1995) . In the case of vision, these claim that top-down connections in the cortical hierarchy capture essential aspects of how the activities of neurons in primary sensory areas are generated by the contents of visually observed scenes. The counterpart to a generative model is its statistical inverse, called a recognition model (Hinton & Zemel, 1994 ). This takes low-level activities and produces probability distributions over the entities in the world that could have led to them, expressed as activities of neurons in higher visual areas that model the image generation process. Even if a generative model is computationally tractable, its associated recognition model may not be. In this paper, we study various di erent types of exact, sampling-based and approximate recognition models in the light of computational and cortical constraints.
I Introduction
There are two popular notions as to the major on-line (as opposed to learning) mode of cortical processing. One concentrates on discrimination or classi cation of input from the sensory epithelium. For instance, if images contain a single handwritten digit, then the task for cortex in recognising or interpreting an image is to produce a probability distribution reporting which digit might be present. Invariances of various sorts are key { successive layers are taken as ignoring ever more information present in the image but irrelevant to the digit class, such as the style of the digit (eg italic or roman), the thickness of the strokes, the position on the page, etc. Purely bottom-up processing in the cortical hierarchy is typically thought of as implementing classi cation, justi ed by results such as Perrett et al's (1982) on the speed of face recognition, whose calculations imply that there little, if any, time for lateral or top-down in uences. There is also substantial statistical theory underlying discrimination. However, its cortical instantiation is somewhat problematical. First, it is not clear how the sort of supervised training that underlies most classi cation systems could be arranged. Second, it is not clear how relevant prior information (such as that the particular writer for an image tends to favour particular curly strokes) can be properly incorporated into the recognition process.
The contending notion suggests that cortex builds a model (usually a probability density model) of the input it receives (Grenander, 1976; Mumford, 1994) . The model captures the statistical structure of the observed input, according probabilities to particular inputs commensurate with their frequency in the world. In ideal circumstances, the model will re ect accurately the actual process by which images are created { eg for the images of handwritten digits, the model will include explicit choices for the identity of the digit, the style, the thickness of the strokes, etc. In cortex, these choices should be instantiated in the activities of particular amongst groups or populations of neurons. Recent statistical models for cortex have taken note of its layered structure (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991) , and suggested that top-down and/or lateral connections contain the generative model. The model represents a (possibly complicated) probabilistic prior over observable scenes.
Given such a model, the most general task in interpreting a particular image is to blend information from the senses with this prior information (consistent with Bayes theorem) to report a posterior distribution over the various generative choices { ie analysis by synthesis. Alternatively, given some loss function, single values might be produced that summarise the posterior probability distribution. If one of the generative choices is the identity of the handwritten digit, then interpreting an image entails reporting the distribution over the digits it might contain. This is a characteristic inverse problem (Marroquin, 1985) { regularisation theory is an alternative way of describing the same operations (Poggio & Torre, 1984) { and is also the conventional way that maximum likelihood models (strictly maximum a posteriori models) are used for classi cation or discrimination. The generative mode for cortex therefore requires the discrimination mode too. This paper studies the discriminative phase, called recognition (Hinton & Zemel, 1994) , that emerges as the Bayesian inverse to top-down generation.
If top-down and/or lateral weights in cortex are involved in the generative model, it is natural to conclude that the bottom-up weights are concerned with recognition. Of course, the other weights could also be involved { there are many cases for which top-down in uences over perception are strong, and others such as binocular rivalry Logothetis et al, 1996) for which there appears to be an on-going interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing (Dayan, 1996) . This paper studies di erent ways that recognition, or approximations to recognition, can be implemented for various sorts of generative model.
In some cases the recognition phase is computationally straightforward. Two important examples are when it is linear, which is the case of factor analysis (FA) discussed in detail in the next section, and when it involves a one-of-n operation, as in a mixture model such as the popular mixture of Gaussians (Nowlan, 1991) and mixture of experts (Jacobs et al, 1991) architectures. Even if exact recognition is tractable, we will see that there are di erent ways of implementing it, mixing combinations of bottom-up, top-down and lateral processing.
For many other generative models, even ones that are simple to specify, recognition is computationally challenging. Two examples are the unsupervised version of the Boltzmann machine (BM; Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986 ) and causal belief networks (eg Pearl, 1988) . For the BM, both the generative and the recognition distributions are computationally intractable to calculate. For directed belief networks, their structure makes it easy to calculate the prior probability over a set of generative choices. However, calculating the posterior probability distribution given an observation is again di cult.
If exact recognition is intractable, one has two options. Markov chain MonteCarlo methods such as Gibbs sampling can be used to collect samples that (at least asymptotically) re ect the exact recognition inverse (Neal, 1992; . 1 In cases like the BM or belief nets, Gibbs sampling speci es a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the true posterior. Typically, one needs to run the chain for a while until transients are sure to have decayed, and then take samples of the states of the chain as being samples from the true recognition distribution. The disadvantage of using Gibbs sampling is the time it takes for transients to decay, and also the number of independent runs necessary if there are large energy barriers between states (or, equivalently, the high variance in the samples). Various methods for overcoming these problems have been suggested, in particular forms of annealing.
If Monte-Carlo sampling based on the true generative model is not to be used, then some form of approximation to the true recognition inverse is needed. Various di erent such schemes have been suggested, each with its own characteristics. The Helmholtz machine (HM; Hinton et al, 1995; Dayan et al, 1995) has a top-down belief-net generative model leading to a lowest layer, which represents the direct sensory report of images. The HM uses a bottom-up belief net to instantiate an approximation to the recognition inverse. In one version, the recognition distribution is described through samples that are generated stochastically (which is computationally easy) { and parameters of this bottomup net are learnt during a training phase to make its samples appropriate. An alternative is to use mean-eld methods Jaakkola et al, 1996) . Here, a parameterised form is chosen for the approximation to the whole inverse distribution for a particular image, where the particular parameterisation is chosen to make calculations easy. The parameters are then updated to minimise a Kullback-Leibler based measure of the di erence between the approximate and the actual recognition distributions. A further alternative to the Helmholtz machine or mean eld methods is to abandon the requirement of nding the true posterior distribution, and rather look for just its maximum.
This paper studies aspects of these di erent recognition choices. We are particularly interested in the relationship between the information contained in the bottom-up weights and that contained in the top-down or generative weights. Iterative recognition schemes that employ top-down weights turn out to require that the bottom-up weights are essentially the transpose of the generative weights (as is also true for principal components analysis). Recognition schemes that concentrate on feedforward processing require bottom-up weights that are not purely the transpose of the top-down weights. In general, there remains an unresolved con ict between having fast and feedforward recognition, as inspired by Perrett et al's (1982) results, and having iterative recognition that blends bottom-up and top-down information in an appropriate way, including handling so-called explaining away e ects in non-linear generative models in which either one generative cause for an input is active, or another one is active, but probably not both. The role of lateral processing is also unclear. There is neither the experimental evidence nor the computational compulsion to adopt one scheme in particular at present. Other issues are also important, particularly the way in which the e cacies of the connections are speci ed through experience, but they are not the current focus.
The next section studies in depth the factor analysis case of a two-layer and linear generative model with Gaussian noise, and comments on its multilayer extension, as in Chou Neal & Dayan, 1996) and was used for to model images of digits by Hinton et al (1996) . Given this generative model, and a particular example x, the role of recognition is to calculate the posterior distribution P yjx] over the generators y given the observed image x, or perhaps instead to calculate some particular value y that summarises this posterior distribution.
The joint distribution over x and y is Gaussian P 
The maximum a posteriori value y MAP comes from minimising ? log P x; y]:
E y] = y T ?1 y + ? x ? G T y T ?1 ? x ? G T y ; ie y MAP = R T x (4) as it must be, since the posterior distribution is Gaussian and therefore unimodal.
The maximum likelihood value y ML comes from setting ?1 = 0 in equation 4, which is dimensionally reasonable in the case in which there are fewer factors than input variables, ie m < n. 
We are now in a position to describe some of the various proposals for recognition. For none of them is it quite clear how the posterior covariance matrix might be represented in cortex (see Neal & Dayan, 1996) . In the case that is rotationally invariant, the factors are infamously rotationally underspeci ed. This allows us the cortically convenient option of taking as being just a diagonal matrix. An additional problem with this linear factor analysis model is that it is only well determined (even up to rotation) if there are su ciently fewer factors than input dimensions. This is not true of cortex, and is not necessary for non-linear factor analysis models (eg Olshausen & Field, 1996) or models that include temporal e ects (eg Rao & Ballard, 1995) .
Bottom-Up Method
The factor analysis version of the Helmholtz machine (Neal & Dayan, 1996 ; Hinton et al, 1996) is similar to the standard version of the Helmholtz machine in that it devotes a set of parameters to a feedforward belief net structure that is intended to approximate the recognition inverse using only bottom-up processing.
This uses the feedforward weights R shown in gure 1, and an explicitly parameterised feedforward recognition covariance matrix . This covariance matrix speci es the parameters of the noise corrupting the mean value R T x, and so can be used to generate samples from the recognition model.
Note that recognition only requires a linear operation on the input pattern
x, but that the relationship between the top-down weights G and the bottom-up weights R is obscured by the priors and . This is characteristic of methods that calculate the posterior distribution (or samples from it) based purely on bottom-up processing. The obscuring factor, ( ?1 + G ?1 G T ) ?1 balances the prior variability of a factor (from ?1 ) with the extent to which that factor might be responsible for inputs, modulated by the extent to which noise might be responsible instead (from G ?1 G T ).
In principal components analysis (PCA), the value y j would be the projection of the input x onto the jth orthonormal eigenvector of the covariance matrix of all the inputs. For PCA, the generative and recognition weight matrices are just transposes of each other (R = G T ), both containing the relevant eigenvectors. Most of the methods discussed below that employ top-down weights during processing also have R = G T , but they do not contain the eigenvectors.
The advantage of the one-shot method in giving the mean of the posterior distribution in a single feedforward operation is o set by the disadvantage that it is not clear what to do if some particular input value x k is not available on a particular case, for instance due to occlusion. R is tailored to the fact that all the inputs will be available. Also, R implicitly incorporates knowledge about the prior over the factors, and so if top-down information can specify a di erent prior covariance matrix 0 6 = on some particular occasion, then the bottom-up weights R will be incorrect. If top-down information only changes the unconditional mean, then the expression for the posterior mean in equation 5
shows that R is still appropriate.
Top-Down Method
More in the spirit of mean eld methods, it is also possible to derive the posterior distribution of equations 3 in an iterative manner, using constitutively the top-down weights that de ne the generative model in the rst place. A good way to understand this is through the same minimum description length (MDL; Rissanen, 1989) coding argument that motivates the Helmholtz machine. Consider using a distributionN N ŷ;^ ] as a stochastic code for example x. This means that a sample y s is drawn fromN , is coded itself using the prior N 0; ] over y, and is used to provide a conditional prior N G T y s ; ] over the actual image x. The net mean description length for example x using this code has two additive components. The rst is the cost of coding the sample y s fromN (minus the bits back, Hinton & Zemel, 1994) , and, on average, is: Shannon's theorem guarantees that the description length F F 1 + F 2 for any choice ofŷ and^ is greater than or equal to ? log P x] under the generative model, and equality holds when the coding distributionN is the true recognition distribution (ie the true probabilistic inverse to the generative distribution). Consider, therefore, minimising F with respect toŷ and^ . The linear and Gaussian nature of the generative model makes the two minimisations independent. As might be expected from equation 3, the optimisation of^ is also independent of the input x and therefore can be done once and for all. Optimisingŷ is more interesting. (8) where is a time constant. The interesting aspect of this equation is its implications for the bottom-up weights and processing in the x layer. Equation 8
suggests calculating the prediction error ? x ? G Tŷ in the x layer (this is the di erence between the actual image x and the image that would be predicted from the mean top-down activitiesŷ), down-weighting this prediction error in the x layer by the noise magnitudes 1= 2 j along each x dimension, and then propagating it through the transpose of the generative weights G to changeŷ. Note the two major di erences from the one-shot approach: a) the system is iterative, based on calculating the prediction errors; and b), as in PCA, the bottom-up weights are the transpose of the generative weights, rather than being dependent also on and . The generative weights G that minimise F will nevertheless in general not be the same as the ones calculated by PCA, ie they will di er from the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of the images.
If there is top-down information that changes the unconditional mean of y, then this just adds an extra term ?1 y to the update equations. Changing the unconditional covariance matrix requires just a change to the update within the y layer, and not a change to the bottom-up weights. Further, if the value of some input dimension is not speci ed on some particular occasion, then it should make no contribution in the term G ?1 ? x ? G Tŷ . This will be the case if the result of top-down in uences on the x layer is to set the relevant component of x equal to its top-down mean, in the absence of any information from the scene.
Top-down inference therefore avoids all the problems alluded to for bottom-up inference, at the expense of requiring iterations to satisfy dŷ=dt = 0.
Olshausen & Field (1996) developed a dynamical system like that of equation 8 from the starting point of minimising the cost: (9) which is closely related to F. 2 In equation 9,ŷ is again the cortical representation of x, and is also chosen to balance two costs. The rst term is intended to encourage sparseness in theŷ, using a penalty term f(y) such as f(y) = log ? 1 + y 2 which encourages y units to be silent. Just like component F 1 in equation 6, this penalty term is essentially equivalent to that coming from a prior P y] / e ?f(y) for the activities in the y layer, in which they are mutually independent. The term ? ?1ŷ in equation 8 is replaced in rŷC(ŷ; G) by a vector whose components are ?f 0 (ŷ i ). However, making f(y) non-quadratic means that there is no longer a separation in the minimisations with respect toŷ and^ (just as certainty equivalence in control theory only holds in the linear case), and so minimising C with respect toŷ becomes itself an approximation. One can write down the equivalent of F, but such a simple dynamical system can only nd (local) maximum a posteriori values and not the true Bayesian conditional mean.
Just like components F 2 in equation 7, the second term in equation 9 encouragesŷ to provide a good model for the image x, through the medium of the generative weights G. Olshausen & Field (1996) showed that realistic generative receptive elds emerge for the y units when recognition is based on choosinĝ y = argminŷC(ŷ; G), and the generative weights are altered based on these values. Reasonable recognition receptive elds for the y units are also observed, but they depend on the images that are presented and require calculatingŷ .
If f(y) is quadratic, as in Rao & Ballard (1995) , and e ectively also in F 1 , then there is actually no incentive forŷ to be sparse. For instance, if there were two units y 1 This version has the attractive characteristic that if all the inputs are speci ed, then the feedforward information is instantly correct, and so iteration would in theory not be required (if the time constant = 1). If some inputs are not speci ed, then, by the same reasoning as above, the system will still nd the correct conditional mean for the factors.
In this simple linear and Gaussian case, there is therefore an update form that is based on: a) the one-shot method used in the conventional Helmholtz machine, and b) the iterative scheme employed in Rao & Ballard (1995) and also in mean eld methods for the non-linear case Olshausen & Field, 1996) .
Hierarchical Factor Analysis . These authors were interested in using Kalman lters in scale rather than in time to build tractable models of inputs that naturally live in multiple dimensions (such as images) rather than one dimension (such as auditory waveforms). The most natural generative model in two-dimensions is a Markov random eld (MRF; Kinderman & Snell, 1980) , but inference in MRFs is notoriously intractable. Chou et al (1994) develop a sophisticated theory of recognition in such structures, and we will mostly just cite the relevant results in our own terms, without writing out the more notionally gruesome ones.
One-Pass Method
The net prior distribution for y a is Gaussian, with mean 0 and covariance matrix a + H a T H a . One can therefore use the results of the previous section to work out the conditional mean and variance of the Gaussian distributions y a jx a , and equivalently y b jx b . Only the means depend on the images x a and x b . It turns out that one can also combine the means of these conditional distributions in a linear manner to work out the mean of the Gaussian distribution zjx a ; x b , including information from both halves of the input. These linear feedforward operations are closely related to those in equation 3, only with added complexity because of the separated inputs. Although one can calculate zjx a ; x b using purely bottom-up calculations, and y a is conditionally independent of y b and therefore x b given z,, the structure of the generative model makes it clear that y a is conditionally dependent on x b in the recognition circumstance in which we are given only x a and x b and not z. In fact, y a ; y b and z are joinly Gaussian, with a hyper-elliptical covariance structure. The Kalman lter framework can be used for smoothing as well as ltering, in this case, feeding information back from zjx a ; x b to update the distribution y a jx a to y a jx a ; x b . show how to do this e ciently using a single top-down pass, in a generalization of the Rauch-Tung-Striebel smoothing algorithm to this tree-like case. Chou et al (1994) also point out a slightly di erent variant on this two pass algorithm in which the bottom-up phase calculates terms such as y a ML ignoring the prior, and then the top-down phase applies all the information about the priors.
Iterative Methods
Although, just as for the case of the two-layer model, there is a substantially e cient non-iterative algorithm, Rao & Ballard (1995) (12) These share with equation 8 the characteristic of how top-down prediction errors at the various levels (ŷ a ?H a Tẑ and x a ?G a Tŷ a ) are downweighted by the noise covariances and propagated bottom-up through the transpose of the generative weight matrices. Since the overall joint distribution z; y a ; y b jx a ; x b is elliptical, the use of these means is slightly tricky. Again, in a non-linear or non-Gaussian case, such as a multilayer analogue of Olshausen & Field's (1996) sparsity prior, the separation between means and covariances would disappear, and it would no longer be possible to use these equations to work out the true posterior means.
There is also an analogue of equation is not clear how to specify a single set of bottom-up weights that can conveniently be used for both one-pass and iterative inference.
III Non-linear Models
The previous section considered the case of linear and Gaussian generative models for which there are computationally tractable ways of calculating the exact recognition inverse distributions. Even though there may be purely bottom-up ways of doing this in regular cases, for which there is no occlusion and no topdown information relevant to inference for a particular image, iterative methods can also be used, and have certain demonstrable advantages. However, linear and Gaussian models are unlikely to su ce, even for the most primitive datasets. One class of non-linear models that has been studied in some depth is that of binary belief networks with sigmoidal activation functions (Neal, 1992; Hinton et al, 1995; Saul et al, 1996) . These preserve the top-down structure of the generative model, but, for a single unit x 1 , they have (cf equation 1):
? G T y 1 (14) where B p] is the binomial distribution with mean p and is a sigmoid function whose output lies between 0 and 1. The activities in layer y are set similarly, except, for a two-layer network, that the only input to the binomial distribution is a bias term. An extra component of y is treated as a bias for determining x.
A three layer network is shown in gure 3a.
Examples of layered belief networks with this structure are given by Hinton et al (1995) , in particular the comparatively large networks (with 4?16?16?64 units in three hidden layers and one input layer) that model 8 8 binary images of handwritten digits. A key aspect of these generative models is that the activities of units within a layer are mutually independent, given the activities of the units in the layer above. This makes specifying the generative probabilities very simple. In such cases, it is again necessary to calculate the recognition inverse to this generative model { now the recognition distribution assigns probabilities to the 2 n binary states of the n hidden units in the network, given the activities in the lowest input layer. For general networks, this distribution is not tractably computable, and therefore sampling or approximations are necessary. Even though in the generative model, activities of units within a layer are independent given the activities in the layer above, activities of units within a layer in the recognition model need not be mutually independent given the activities in the layer below.
The non-linear belief net model makes for much richer generative and recognition models than the linear Gaussian models of factor analysis. Two very simple but revealing generative models are shown in gure 3b;c. The left example shows a case of explaining away (Pearl, 1988) . All the units are most likely to be o (0). However, the occurrence of x being on (1) requires explanation by either y 1 = 1 or y 2 = 1. The a priori unlikelihood that the y units are active makes it unlikely that y 1 = y 2 = 1; having y 1 = 1 explains away x = 1 and so obviates the need for y 2 = 1 as well. Figure 3c is a modi cation of this example in which y 1 tends to generate x 1 = x 2 = 1. 
Bottom-Up Method
The Helmholtz machine (see gure 3a) suggests building a bottom-up recognition model that is also a sigmoidal belief net and (at least in the stochastic version) drawing samples from this net to approximate the full recognition distribution. Two simpli cations are made: a) despite the caveat above, the activities of units within a layer are forced to be independent given the activities in the layer below, to avoid having to parameterise and manipulate the full conditional distribution within each layer, 3 and b) the connections of the recognition belief net are set using an incorrect training procedure that chooses them to minimise (locally) a wrong error measure that is nonetheless computationally convenient. Write the states of all the units other than the inputs (x) as . Then, if the probability accorded to a particular by the recognition model is Q (R), where R are the weights of the non-linear recognition model, then R should correctly be chosen to minimise KLfQ (R); P jx]g (Hinton & Zemel et al, 1994) . Instead, in the sleep learning procedure , they are chosen to minimise
KLfP jx]; Q (R)g. Since the Kullback-Leibler divergence is not symmetric, these quantities are not the same. If the divergence cannot be forced to be 0 (as is likely given the approximations employed), then the main di erence is that minimising the rst requires that P jx] be small whenever Q (R) is small, whereas minimising the second requires that Q (R) be small whenever P jx]
is small. This bottom-up method for approximating the recognition model works quite well in practice (see Frey et al, 1996) . However, in cases such as explaining away (including the simple example of gure 3b) it fails. It assigns independent bottom-up probabilities of 0:5 to y 1 = 1 and y 2 = 1, and so 50% of the time chooses settings for y that are incorrect.
The bottom-up recognition inverse to the generative model in gure 3c is correct. The point is that if x 1 = x 2 = 1 for a particular case, then it must be that y 1 = 1 rather than y 2 = 1. Even though the generative weight from y 2 to x 2 is 0, the recognition weight from x 2 to y 2 is negative. A more interesting case of this is seen in the weight patterns for the 8-bit shifter problem in . Units in the rst hidden layer generate the activity of single pixels within both eyes, shifted by one pixel left or right with respect to each other. The recognition weights for these units have positive values for the pixels whose activities are actually generated, but inhibitory side-lobes from the neighbouring pixels, to avoid spurious activation.
It has been suggested that lateral connections within a layer might be used as in a Boltzmann machine solely for the recognition model ). The generative model would still involve only top-down in uences as in gure 3a (to ensure that the the generative model is still tractable), but the recognition model would employ lateral links to circumvent the requirement that the units within a layer be independent. The disadvantage is that computationally complex Gibbs sampling within a layer has to be used to instantiate recognition. Also, in cases such as explaining away, there would have to be an explicit negative lateral connection between y 1 and y 2 .
Top-Down Methods Mean-eld The major alternatives to the bottom-up recognition model described above are mean eld methods, pioneered for belief nets by Saul, Jaakkola & Jordan (1996) and Jaakkola, . These e ectively choose a parameterisation for an approximation to the recognition distribution for a particular case, and optimise the parameters to minimise the equivalent of the correct Kullback-Leibler divergence. Most approximations force all the units to be mutually independent (not just those units within a single layer, given the activities in the layer below). One can treat the linear and Gaussian case from the previous section exactly in mean-eld terms, using a parameterisation with means for all the units and a particular covariance structure. Minimising the Kullback-Leibler divergence turns out to require satisfying a set of self-consistency equations at each unit, and there are algorithms that descend monotonically in the divergence whilst updating units asynchronously using only information local to a unit and its incoming and outgoing connections. In the linear Gaussian case, solving these self-consistency equations is exactly solving for the correct mean values.
The mean eld theory of Jaakkola et al (1996) Gibbs sampling An alternative approach to calculating the recognition distribution is to use a Markov-chain Monte-Carlo method such as Gibbs sampling. Neal (1992) discusses Gibbs sampling in sigmoidal belief nets in some detail, including the use of such samples for learning the generative weights. Here, we point out a simple approximation in the limit of small generative weights that shows the similarity with the other top-down uses of bottom-up connections.
In the case in gure 3a, with (a) = 1=(1 + e ?a ), we are interested in sampling from P y; zjx]. In the simplest version of Gibbs sampling, we visit each of the units in layers y and z in some random sequence, and choose a new state stochastically, taking into account in uences from its parents (just the generative biases for the z units) and its children. Take unit y 1 , writing y = fy 2 ; : : : ; y n g. 
which consists of the obvious top-down in uence from z and a bottom-up in uence that tends to reduce the prediction error (x i ? P x i = 1jy]) for the state of x i . Just as in the other top-down cases (such as the dynamic system in equation 8 or the mean eld theory of Jaakkola et al, 1996) the prediction error is propagated bottom-up through the transpose of the generative weights G. Gibbs sampling then requires that y 1 be set to 1 with probability ( 1 ). As for mean eld methods, explaining away can be handled by Gibbs sampling (although not quite as in equation 17, since the weights are not insubstantial), again without recourse to direct connections between y 1 and y 2 .
For the generative model in gure 3c, note how making the recognition weight from x 2 to y 2 zero rather than negative makes it more complicated to work out that if x 1 = x 2 = 1, then y 1 = 1 rather than y 2 = 1.
IV Discussion
In this paper, we have studied the issue of inverting various sorts of directed belief net generative models. Such generative models are attractive as ways of capturing the essence of the hierarchical structure of cortex, where the activities of neurons in successively higher cortical areas represent the generation of successively more abstract entities in scenes. Inverting the generative models, ie going from sensory input to the activities of the neurons that represent its likely generators, is essential to interpret scenes, and also (though this has not been stressed here) to learn appropriate generative models. The inverse operation, called recognition, is akin to discrimination or classi cation, and, in many cases, doing it exactly is computationally intractable. We assume that the bottom-up weights in the cortex (from V1 to V2, etc) are important for recognition, but that they may operate in conjunction with the top-down and lateral weights. We have also seen some of the relationships amongst recent suggestions as to how cortex might implement a generative model.
Various schemes for performing recognition have been suggested. One class uses only bottom-up connections, either for exact recognition, as for factor analysis, or for approximate recognition, as for the Helmholtz machine. In the latter case, it is tractable to draw samples stochastically from the bottom-up model. Although purely bottom-up models are fast, a strong requirement suggested by evidence on the speed of processing images of objects, they su er from a number of disadvantages in terms of the di culty of incorporating top-down information, coping with occlusion, and integrating information from disparate parts of a scene further than the credible spread of feedforward connections. Further, in important cases such as explaining away, bottom-up models that make reasonable approximations, such as that the activities of units in a layer are mutually independent given the activities in the layer below, are incompetent.
An alternative scheme is suggested by mean eld methods . Here a parameterised form is chosen for the recognition distribution for a particular case, and the parameters are set by an optimisation process. For suitable parameterisations, optimisation is achieved by a set of local operations. Although there are no bottom-up weights as such for mean eld methods, we saw various cases in which the in uence of the units in one layer on those in the layer above is calculated by passing some form of prediction error (ie the di erence between their actual activation and the activation predicted on the basis of the states of the units in the layer above) through the transpose of the generative weights. Optimisation is iterative { this solves the problems mentioned for the purely bottom-up method, but raises questions as to the time required. We saw simple cases in which there is a di erence between the bottom-up weights implied by purely bottom-up recognition and the bottom-up weights implied by this top-down scheme.
A further alternative was to use lateral weights within each layer. This was either to eliminate the requirement for iteration between layers (as in equation 8), or to x problems with approximations made for bottom-up inference, as in explaining away.
Di erent generative models impose di erent requirements on their recognition inverses. Linear models with Gaussian noise are particularly simple { even in the case of with multiple layers and only partial connectivity, there are algorithms for working out the true recognition inverses which require nothing more than one bottom-up and one top-down pass. Non-linear models, such as the layered belief nets of gure 3a do not possess such tractable inverses, and so approximations are necessary. This analysis is unsatisfyingly incomplete. Foremost, the interaction between bottom-up, top-down and lateral connections is still open. Given the structural di erences between lateral and bottom-up weights, one might expect to nd a computational di erence too. Top-down in uences must clearly be felt during recognition; however it is not apparent how to have bottom-up weights that implement one-shot recognition in ideal circumstances, but can be used for interacting bottom-up and top-down processing in less ideal cases. The role of the lateral weights is also mysterious. One suggestion is that they help repair problems with too restrictive approximations in the bottom-up recognition model, but this use imposes strong requirements on the presence of dense connections (so that all cases of explaining away in the generative model can be properly handled) and/or on the time available for Gibbs sampling. If the lateral weights are also involved in specifying the generative model, then the whole system becomes a form of Boltzmann machine.
An issue raised by the Kalman lter models of section 2 is the various covariance matrices for the activities at di erent layers. In the linear cases with Gaussian noise that we have considered, the covariance matrices are xed once the parameters of the generative model are xed, and they do not depend on the input for a particular scene. In non-linear cases, and in cases which include temporal e ects (Rao & Ballard, 1995) , this is not true. Retaining just the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix of the activities is simple (Sutton, 1992) . Retaining the o -diagonal terms is more complicated because of their numerosity and the complexity of the calculations that lead to them.
Apart from capturing its general hierarchical characteristics, none of the models in this paper is very faithful to the real details of cortical processing. Apart from the many complexities of the structure of lower and higher visual processing areas, important issues are that the anatomical spread of top-down connections is broader than that of the bottom-up connections, and that there appears to be a di erence over developmental time in their speci cation. For instance, the top-down connections from V2 to V1 in humans wait in the lowest cortical layers in V1 for a few months, and only migrate to what becomes their main targets in layer 2 at the same time that the intracortical lateral connections within layer 2 are also maturing (Burkhalter, 1993) . This might favour a di erent class of models (Luttrell, 1995) from the ones discussed here in which the bottomup recognition weights are actually primary, heeding some other developmental call, and the top-down and lateral weights merely build the generative model that is most consistent with whatever activities the recognition model ultimately speci es.
